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6.
Section 4 deals with the longer form of procedure.
Section
4 (1) places within the discretion of the Governor in Council the question as to whether the proposed de portes is liable to depor- tation and should be deported. Section 4(2) provides that
no steps other than those expressly specified in the section
shall be necessary.
This is intended to meet arguments drawn
from the procedure of criminal trials, for example a suggestion
that the deportee was entitled to be heard by counsel before the
Governor in Council. Section 4(11) practically repeats the
wording of section 4(1) and of section 13.
7. Though the present Ordinance may be more explicit on this
point of absolute discretion, it is thought that it does not in-
troduce any change in the law in this direction, It has
always been be lieved that the same absolute power was implied in
the provisions of the former Deportation Ordinances, and in the
case of Re Lo Tsun Man, (1910) 5 H.K.L.R. 166, it was held by
the Full Court that the power of the Governor in Council under
the Banishment and Conditional Pardons Ordinance, 1882, was
absolute, and that the Court had no power to review his decision,
It need hardly be said that this absolute power must be exercised
in a judicial way, and its very absolute nature is an additional
reason for avoiding any arbitrary or unreasonable action,
8. Section 4 (3) is intended to exclude any defence analogous
to that of autrefois acquit.
9.
Section 4(14) (a) (b) and (c) make it passible to deport
persons guilty of the offences or misconduct therein specified
whatever the nationality may be of such persons,
10.
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